Exploring ADINT: Using Ad Targeting for Surveillance on a Budget — or — How Alice Can Buy Ads to Track Bob | Vines, Roesner, Kohno

Paul Vines, Franziska Roesner, Tadayoshi Kohno; Exploring ADINT: Using Ad Targeting for Surveillance on a Budget — or — How Alice Can Buy Ads to Track Bob; In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2017); 2017-10-30; 11 pages; outreach.

tl;dr → Tadayoshi et al. are virtuosos at these performance art happenings. Catchy hook, cool marketing name (ADINT) and press outreach frontrunning the actual conference venue. For the wuffie and the lulz. Nice demo tho.
and → They bought geofence campaigns in a grid. They used close-the-loop analytics to identify the sojourn trail of the target.
and → dont’ use Grindr.

Abstract

The online advertising ecosystem is built upon the ability of advertising networks to know properties about users (e.g., their interests or physical locations) and deliver targeted ads based on those properties. Much of the privacy debate around online advertising has focused on the harvesting of these properties by the advertising networks. In this work, we explore the following question: can third-parties use the purchasing of ads to extract private information about individuals? We find that the answer is yes. For example, in a case study with an archetypal advertising network, we find that — for $1000 USD — we can track the location of individuals who are using apps served by that advertising network, as well as infer whether they are using potentially sensitive applications (e.g., certain religious or sexuality-related apps). We also conduct a broad survey of other ad networks and assess their risks to similar attacks. We then step back and explore the implications of our findings.

Mentions

  • Markets
    They chose

    • Facebooik
    • not Google
    • etc.
    • not to fight with big DSPs;
      the picked the weaker ones to highlight.
  • Apps
    They chose

    • lower-quality apps.
    • adult apps
      few “family oriented” [none?] apps.
    • <ahem>Adult Diapering Diary</ahem>
      <ahem>Adult Diapering Diary</ahem>

Claimed

  • DSPs sell 8m CEP (precision) location.

Spooky Cool Military Lingo

  • SIGINT
  • HUMINT
  • ADINT

Targeting Dimensions

  • Demographics
  • Interests
  • Personally-Identifying Information (PII)
  • Domain (a usage taxonomy)
  • Location
  • Identifiers
    • Cookie Identifier
    • Mobile Ad Identifier (e.g. IDFA, GPSAID)
  • Technographics
    • Device (Make Model OS)
    • Network (Carrier)
  • Search

Media Types

Supply-Side Platforms (SSPs)

  • Adbund
  • InnerActive
  • MobFox
  • Smaato
  • Xapas

Supply (the adware itself, The Applications, The Apps)

  • Adult Diapering Diary
  • BitTorrent
  • FrostWire
  • Grindr
  • Hide My Texts
  • Hide Pictures vault
  • Hornet
  • iFunny
  • Imgur
  • Jack’D
  • Meet24
  • MeetMe
  • Moco
  • My Mixtapez Music
  • Pregnant Mommy’s Maternity
  • Psiphon
  • Quran Reciters
  • Romeo
  • Tagged
  • Talkatone
  • TextFree
  • TextMe
  • TextPlus
  • The Chive
  • uTorrent
  • Wapa
  • Words with Friends

Demand-Side Platforms (DSPs)

  • Ademedo
  • AddRoll
  • AdWords
  • Bing
  • Bonadza
  • BluAgile
  • Centro
  • Choozle
  • Criteo
  • ExactDrive
  • Facebook
  • GetIntent
  • Go2Mobi
  • LiquidM
  • MediaMath
  • MightyHive
  • Simpli.Fi
  • SiteScout
  • Splicky
  • Tapad

Promotions

References

  • Gunes Acar, Christian Eubank, Steven Englehardt, Marc Juarez, Arvind Narayanan, Claudia Diaz. 2014. The Web Never Forgets: Persistent Tracking Mechanisms in the Wild. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
  • Rebecca Balebako, Pedro Leon, Richard Shay, Blase Ur, Yang Wang, L Cranor. 2012. Measuring the effectiveness of privacy tools for limiting behavioral advertising. In Web 2.0 Security and Privacy.
  • Hal Berghel. 2001. Caustic Cookies. In His Blog.
  • Interactive Advertising Bureau. 2015. IAB Tech Lab Content Taxonomy.
  • Interactive Advertising Bureau. 2017. IAB Interactive Advertising Wiki.
  • Giuseppe Cattaneo, Giancarlo De Maio, Pompeo Faruolo, Umberto Ferraro Petrillo. 2013. A review of security attacks on the GSM standard. In Information and Communication Technology-EurAsia Conference. Springer, pages 507–512.
  • Robert M Clark. 2013. Perspectives on Intelligence Collection. In The intelligencer, a Journal of US Intelligence Studies 20, 2, pages 47–53.
  • David Cole. 2014. We kill people based on metadata. In The New York Review of Books
  • Jonathan Crussell, Ryan Stevens, Hao Chen. 2014. Madfraud: Investigating ad fraud in android applications. In Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services. ACM, pages 123–134.
  • Doug DePerry, Tom Ritter, Andrew Rahimi. 2013. Cloning with a Compromised CDMA Femtocell.
  • Google Developers. 2017. Google Ads.
  • Steven Englehardt and Arvind Narayanan. 2016. Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, pages 1388–1401.
  • Steven Englehardt, Dillon Reisman, Christian Eubank, Peter Zimmerman, Jonathan Mayer, Arvind Narayanan, Edward W Felten. 2015. Cookies that give you away: The surveillance implications of web tracking. In Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on World Wide Web. ACM, pages 289–299.
  • Go2mobi. 2017.
  • Aleksandra Korolova. 2010. Privacy violations using microtargeted ads: A case study. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Conference on IEEE Data Mining Workshops (ICDMW), pages 474–482.
  • Zhou Li, Kehuan Zhang, Yinglian Xie, Fang Yu, XiaoFeng Wang. 2012. Knowing your enemy: understanding and detecting malicious web advertising. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, pages 674–686.
  • Nicolas Lidzborski. 2014. Staying at the forefront of email security and reliability: HTTPS-only and 99.978 percent availability.; In Their Blog. Google.
  • Steve Mansfield-Devine. 2015. When advertising turns nasty. In Network Security 11, pages 5–8.
  • Jeffrey Meisner. 2014. Advancing our encryption and transparency efforts. In Their Blog, Microsoft.
  • Rick Noack. 2014. Could using gay dating app Grindr get you arrested in Egypt?. In The Washington Post.
  • Franziska Roesner, Tadayoshi Kohno, David Wetherall. 2012. Detecting and Defending Against Third-Party Tracking on the Web. In Proceedings of the USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI).
  • Sooel Son, Daehyeok Kim, Vitaly Shmatikov. 2016. What mobile ads know about mobile users. In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS).
  • Mark Joseph Stern. 2016. This Daily Beast Grindr Stunt Is Sleazy, Dangerous, and Wildly Unethical. In Slate, 2016.
  • Ryan Stevens, Clint Gibler, Jon Crussell, Jeremy Erickson, Hao Chen. 2012. Investigating user privacy in android ad libraries. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Mobile Security Technologies<e/m> (MoST).
  • Ratko Vidakovic. 2013. The Mechanics Of Real-Time Bidding. In Marketingland.
  • Craig E. Wills and Can Tatar. 2012. Understanding what they do with what they know. In Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES).
  • Tom Yeh, Tsung-Hsiang Chang, Robert C Miller. 2009. Sikuli: using GUI screenshots for search and automation. In Proceedings of the 22nd annual ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology. ACM, pages 183–192.
  • Apostolis Zarras, Alexandros Kapravelos, Gianluca Stringhini, Thorsten Holz, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna. 2014. The dark alleys of madison avenue: Understanding malicious advertisements. In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference
  • Tiliang Zhang, Hua Zhang, Fei Gao. 2013. A Malicious Advertising Detection Scheme Based on the Depth of URL Strategy. In Proceedings of the 2013 Sixth International Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Design (ISCID), Vol. 2. IEEE, pages 57–60.
  • Peter Thomas Zimmerman. 2015. Measuring privacy, security, and censorship through the utilization of online advertising exchanges. Technical Report. Tech. rep., Princeton University.

Argot

The Suitcase Words

  • Mobile Advertising ID (MAID)
  • Demand-Side Platform (DSP)
  • Supply-Side Platform (SSP)
  • Global Positioning System (GPS)
  • Google Play Store (GPS)
  • geofencing
  • cookie tracking
  • Google Advertising Identifier (GAID)
    Google Play Services Advertising Identifier (GAID)
  • Facebook
  • Snowden
  • WiFi

Previously filled.

Internet of Things – Privacy and Security in a Connected World | FTC

Internet of Things – Privacy and Security in a Connected World (IoT); Federal Trade Commission (FTC); 2013-11-19.

Promotions

Via: backfill

Mentioned

National Science Foundation

Keith Marzulo

Collateral, slides 1121

  • Precious Nomenclature
    • Ubiquitous Computing
    • Pervasive Computing
    • Distributed Sensor Networks
    • Internet of Things
    • Cyber-Physical Systems
  • NSF CPS Program
  • Paul Ford, Some Opinement; Hemispheres; 2013-11; pages 66-68.
  • Highlighted Programs
    • Networked Embedded Sensor-Rich Systems (ActionWebs)
      • Claire Tomlin, Edward Lee, S. Shankar Sastry, David
        Culler (Berkeley)
      • Hamsa Balakrishnan (MIT)
    • Foundations Of Resilient Cyber-physical Systems (FORCES)
      • who?
    • Advanced Transportation Systems
      • Raj Rajkumar, Ed Clarke, John Dolan, Sicuan Gao, Paul
        Ribski, David Wettergreen, Paolo Zuliana (CMU)
    • Environment Monitoring (Intelligent River)
    • Semantic Security Monitoring for Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
      • Robin Sommer (Berkeley)
      • Adam Slagell & Ravishankar Iyer (Illinois)
    • Reprogramming a Pacemaker
      • Kevin Fu (Mass-Amherst; Michigan)
    • Reprogramming Automobiles
      • Tadayoshi Kohno & Shwetak Patel (U Washington)
      • Stefan Savage & Ingolf Krueger (UCSD)
    • Security and Privacy in Vehicular Cyber-Physical Systems
      • Hari Balakrishnan, Samuel Madden, Daniela Rus (MIT)
    • Secure Telerobotics
      • Howard Jay Chizeck & Tadayoshi Kohno (Washington)

Microsoft

M.H. Carolyn Nguyen
Director, Technology Policy Group, Microsoft

Collateral, slides 22-39

Panel 1: The Smart Home

  • Michael Beyerle, GE Appliances
  • Jeff Hagins, SmartThings
  • Craig Heffner, Tactical Network Solutions
  • Eric Lightner, Department of Energy
  • Lee Tien, Electronic Frontier Foundation

Collateral, slides 40-57

  • Connected Platform
    • ACM controller to appliances
    • GEA server (cloud controlled)
    • iOS & Android apps
  • SmartThings
  • Smart home
  • SmartSense Product Line: Multi, Presence,Hub, Motion, Outlet

An Internet of Things

Vint Cerf
Slides 58-72

Collateral

  • Gee Whiz, my how far we’ve come, what a long strange trip it’s been
  • Smart Cities
  • Self-Driving Cars
  • Implications, Challenges & Opportunities

Panel 2: Connected Health & Fitness

Moderator: Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen

  • Stan Crosley, Indiana University
  • Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Center for Democracy & Technology
  • Anand Iyer, WellDoc Communications
  • Scott Peppet, University of Colorado School of Law
  • Jay Radcliffe, InGuardians

Collateral, slides 73-75

  • Insulin Pump
  • BlueStar

Panel 3: Connected Cars

  • Yoshi Kohno, University of Washington
  • John Nielsen, American Automobile Association
  • Wayne Powell, Toyota Technical Center
  • Christopher Wolf, Future of Privacy Forum

Collateral

  • none

Panel 4: Privacy and Security in a Connected World

  • Ryan Calo, University of Washington Law School
  • Dan Caprio, McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP
  • Michelle Chibba, Office of Information & Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
  • Drew Hickerson, Happtique
  • David Jacobs, Electronic Privacy Information Center
  • Marc Rodgers, Lookout Security

Collateral, slides 79-85

  • Four Scenarios (user stories)

Collateral

Some papers on “neuro” and “security” and “legal”

Tamara Denning, Yoky Matsuoka, Tadayoshi Kohno; Neurosecurity: security and privacy for neural devices; In Neurosurgery Focus; Volume 27; 2009-07; 4 pages.

Abstract:
An increasing number of neural implantable devices will become available in the near future due to advances in neural engineering. This discipline holds the potential to improve many patients’ lives dramatically by offering improved—and in some cases entirely new—forms of rehabilitation for conditions ranging from missing limbs to degenerative cognitive diseases. The use of standard engineering practices, medical trials, and neuroethical evaluations during the design process can create systems that are safe and that follow ethical guidelines; unfortunately, none of these disciplines currently ensure that neural devices are robust against adversarial entities trying to exploit these devices to alter, block, or eavesdrop on neural signals. The authors define “neurosecurity”—a version of computer science security principles and methods applied to neural engineering—and discuss why neurosecurity should be a critical consideration in the design of future neural devices.

Nita A. Farahany; Incriminating Thoughts; Stanford Law Review Vol. 64, 351 (2012)
Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 11-17; 2011-04; 59 pages; available at SSRN.

Abstract:
The neuroscience revolution poses profound challenges to current self-incrimination doctrine and exposes a deep conceptual confusion at the heart of the doctrine. In Schmerber v. California, the Court held that under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, no person shall be compelled to “prove a charge [from] his own mouth,” but a person may be compelled to provide real or physical evidence. This testimonial/physical dichotomy has failed to achieve its intended simplifying purpose. For nearly fifty years scholars and practitioners have lamented its impracticability and its inconsistency with the underlying purpose of the privilege. This Article seeks to reframe the debate. It demonstrates through modern applications from neuroscience the need to redefine the taxonomy of evidence subject to the privilege against self-incrimination. Evidence can arise from the identifying characteristics inherent to individuals; it can arise automatically, without conscious processing; it can arise through memorialized photographs, papers, and memories; or it can arise through responses uttered silently or aloud. This spectrum — identifying, automatic, memorialized, and uttered — is more nuanced and more precise than the traditional testimonial/physical dichotomy, and gives descriptive power to the rationale underpinning the privilege against self-incrimination. Neurological evidence, like more traditional evidence, may be located on this spectrum, and thus doctrinal riddles of self-incrimination, both modern and ancient, may be solved.

M. Ryan Calo; Open Robotics; Maryland Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 3, 2011; 2011-11-09; 42 pages; Available at SSRN.

Abstract:
With millions of home and service robots already on the market, and millions more on the way, robotics is poised to be the next transformative technology. As with personal computers, personal robots are more likely to thrive if they are sufficiently open to third-party contributions of software and hardware. No less than with telephony, cable, computing, and the Internet, an open robotics could foster innovation, spur consumer adoption, and create secondary markets.
But open robots also present the potential for inestimable legal liability, which may lead entrepreneurs and investors to abandon open robots in favor of products with more limited functionality. This possibility flows from a key difference between personal computers and robots. Like PCs, open robots have no set function, run third-party software, and invite modification. But unlike PCs, personal robots are in a position directly to cause physical damage and injury. Thus, norms against suit and expedients to limit liability such as the economic loss doctrine are unlikely to transfer from the PC and consumer software context to that of robotics.
This essay therefore recommends a selective immunity for manufacturers of open robotic platforms for what end users do with these platforms, akin to the immunity enjoyed under federal law by firearms manufacturers and websites. Selective immunity has the potential to preserve the conditions for innovation without compromising incentives for safety. The alternative is to risk being left behind in a key technology by countries with a higher bar to litigation and a serious head start.

Ivan Martinovic, Doug Davies, Mario Frank, Daniele Perito, Tomas Ros, Dawn Song; On the Feasibility of Side-Channel Attacks with Brain-Computer Interfaces; In Proceedings of the USENIX Security Conference; 2012-08-08; landing (with video)

Abstract:
Brain computer interfaces (BCI) are becoming increasingly popular in the gaming and entertainment industries. Consumer-grade BCI devices are available for a few hundred dollars and are used in a variety of applications, such as video games, hands-free keyboards, or as an assistant in relaxation training. There are application stores similar to the ones used for smart phones, where application developers have access to an API to collect data from the BCI devices. The security risks involved in using consumer-grade BCI devices have never been studied and the impact of malicious software with access to the device is unexplored. We take a first step in studying the security implications of such devices and demonstrate that this upcoming technology could be turned against users to reveal their private and secret information. We use inexpensive electroencephalography (EEG) based BCI devices to test the feasibility of simple, yet effective, attacks. The captured EEG signal could reveal the user’s private informa tion about, e.g., bank cards, PIN numbers, area of living, the knowledge of the known persons. This is the first attempt to study the security implications of consumer-grade BCI devices. We show that the entropy of the private information is decreased on the average by approximately 15 – 40 % compared to random guessing attacks.

Referenced Within

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