DNSCrypt from OpenDNS

DNSCrypt

Mentions

Unrelated

Promotions

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NaCl : Networking and Cryptography library

  • Pronounced “salt”
  • Stands for “Networking and Cryptography Library”
  • Is in the public domain
  • Aspires to be patent clean; has not received any claims of patent infringement.

Availability

Authors’ release

Forks & Additions

Who

(main)

  • Daniel J. Bernstein (University of Illinois at Chicago)
  • Tanja Lange (Technische Universiteit Eindhoven)
  • Peter Schwabe (Academia Sinica)

Also

(alphabetical)

  • Niels Duif (Technische Universiteit Eindhoven)
  • Emilia Käsper (Google, ex-Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
  • Adam Langley (Google)Matthew Dempsky (Google, ex-Mochi Media)
  • Sean Lynch (Facebook)
  • Jan Mojzis
  • Bo-Yin Yang (Academia Sinica)

Capabilities

  • Curve25519
  • Salsa20
  • Poly1305

Programs

  • SUPERCOP => System for Unified Performance Evaluation Related to Cryptographic Operations and Primitives, an API
  • eBACS => ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Systems
  • eSTREAM => the ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project

Mentions

  • IEEE P1363
  • NIST P-256
  • NIST “Suite B”
    • twist security
    • Montgomery representation
    • Edwards representation
  • AES
    • AES-GCM
  • Curve25519
    • Ed25519
  • Diffie-Hellman
    • ECDH
  • DNS
    • DNSCrypt
    • DNSCurve
    • DNSSEC
  • DSA
    • ECDSA
    • EdDSA
  • ElGamal
  • HMAC
  • OpenSSL
  • PKCS
    • PKCS#1
  • Poly1305
    • Poly1305-AES
  • RIPEMD
    • RIPEMD-160
  • RSA
    • RSA-1024
    • RSA-2048
    • RSA-SHA1
    • RSA-SHA256
  • Schnorr
  • TCP
    • CurveCP
  • TLS (SSL)
    • DTLS
    • GnuTLS
  • TWIRL

Promotion

Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, Peter Schwabe; The security impact of a new cryptographic library; In Proceedings of LatinCrypt 2012; 2012-07-25; 18 pages.

Abstract

This paper introduces a new cryptographic library, NaCl, and explains how the design and implementation of the library avoid various types of cryptographic disasters su ffered by previous cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL. Specifi cally, this paper analyzes the security impact of the following NaCl features: no data flow from secrets to load addresses; no data flow from secrets to branch conditions; no padding oracles; centralizing randomness; avoiding unnecessary randomness; extremely high speed; and cryptographic primitives chosen conservatively in light of the cryptanalytic literature.

Usage

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