Personality, Gender, and Age in the Language of Social Media: The Open-Vocabulary Approach | Schwartz, Eichstaedt, Kern, Dziurzynski, Ramones, Agrawal, Shah, Kosinski, Stillwell, Seligman, Ungar

H. Andrew Schwartz, Johannes C. Eichstaedt, Margaret L. Kern, Lukasz Dziurzynski, Stephanie M. Ramones, Megha Agrawal, Achal Shah, Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell, Martin E. P. Seligman, Lyle H. Ungar; Personality, Gender, and Age in the Language of Social Media: The Open-Vocabulary Approach; In PLoS One; 2013-09-23; 16 pages; landing.


We analyzed 700 million words, phrases, and topic instances collected from the Facebook messages of 75,000 volunteers, who also took standard personality tests, and found striking variations in language with personality, gender, and age. In our open-vocabulary technique, the data itself drives a comprehensive exploration of language that distinguishes people, finding connections that are not captured with traditional closed-vocabulary word-category analyses. Our analyses shed new light on psychosocial processes yielding results that are face valid (e.g., subjects living in high elevations talk about the mountains), tie in with other research (e.g., neurotic people disproportionately use the phrase ‘sick of’ and the word ‘depressed’), suggest new hypotheses (e.g., an active life implies emotional stability), and give detailed insights (males use the possessive ‘my’ when mentioning their ‘wife’ or ‘girlfriend’ more often than females use ‘my’ with ‘husband’ or ’boyfriend’). To date, this represents the largest study, by an order of magnitude, of language and person


  • Differential Language Analysis (DLA)
  • Five Factor Model (FFM), Big Five
  • Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)
  • Open Vocabularoy, Closed Vocabulary
  • Regression
    • L0 Norm
    • L1 Norm
  • multi-predictor to multi-output regression
  • World Well-Being Program
  • Method
    • Linguistic Feature Extraction
    • Correlational Analysis
    • Visualization
  • Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI)
  • Pott’s happyfuntokenizer for <3 and :-)
  • Personality Tests
    • My Personality, an app
    • International Personality Item Pool
    • NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R)
  • Vocabulatires
    • Language of Gender
    • Language of Age
    • Language of Personality
  • Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)


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The Me Me Me Generation | Joel Stein @ TIME Magazine

The Me Me Me Generation; Joel Stein; In TIME Magazine; 2013-05-20; paywalled.

tl;dr => lite; runs towards Twenge; does not cite Strauss & Howe; no recent material.


from a paper copy… in rough order of appearance


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Data Doppelgängers and the Uncanny Valley of Personalization | Sara M. Watson

Data Doppelgängers and the Uncanny Valley of Personalization; ; In The Atlantic; 2014-06-16.
Teaser: Why customized ads are so creepy, even when they miss their target


  • Masahiro Mori
  • Acxiom
  • Facebook

<quote>Personalization appeals to a Western, egocentric belief in individualism. Yet it is based on the generalizing statistical distributions and normalized curves methods used to classify and categorize large populations. Personalization purports to be uniquely meaningful, yet it alienates us in its mass application. Data tracking and personalized advertising is often described as “creepy.” Personalized ads and experiences are supposed to reflect individuals, so when these systems miss their mark, they can interfere with a person’s sense of self. It’s hard to tell whether the algorithm doesn’t know us at all, or if it actually knows us better than we know ourselves. And it’s disconcerting to think that there might be a glimmer of truth in what otherwise seems unfamiliar. This goes beyond creepy, and even beyond the sense of being watched. </quote>




Attributed To: jimi Wales Wiki

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Overview of ‘The Downward Ramp’, Opinements Upon the Economic Condition


in archaeological order … derivative works on top, originals below

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  • Concept
    • U-Shaped pattern
    • polarization
    • hollowing out
  • Trend
    • New College Grads (NCG) do service jobs, not “knowledge work”


in archaeological order



Josh Bivens, Elise Gould, Lawrence Mishel, Heidi Shierholz; Raising America’s Pay: Why It’s Our Central Economic Policy Challenge; Economic Policy Institute; 2014-06-04; x pages; landing, press release.


The clear connections between wages, income, and living standards mean that progress in reversing inequality, boosting living standards, and alleviating poverty will be extraordinarily difficult without addressing wage growth. Indeed, converting the slow and unequal wage growth of the last three-and-a-half decades into broad-based wage growth is the core economic challenge of our time.

Slow and unequal wage growth in recent decades stems from a growing wedge between overall productivity and pay. In the three decades following World War II, hourly compensation of the vast majority of workers rose in line with productivity. But for most of the past generation (except for a brief period in the late 1990s), pay for the vast majority has lagged further and further behind overall productivity. This breakdown of pay growth has been especially evident in the last decade, affecting both college- and non-college-educated workers as well as blue- and white-collar workers.

This paper argues that broad-based wage growth is necessary to address a constellation of economic challenges the United States faces: boosting income growth for low- and moderate-income Americans, checking or reversing the rise of income inequality, enhancing social mobility, reducing poverty, and aiding asset-building and retirement security. The paper also points out that strong wage growth for the vast majority can boost macroeconomic growth and stability in the medium run by closing the chronic shortfall in aggregate demand (a problem sometimes referred to as “secular stagnation”). Finally, the paper argues that any analyses of the causes of rising inequality and wage stagnation must consider the role of changes in labor market policies and business practices, which are given far too little attention by researchers and policymakers.

Andrew Sum, Ishwar Khatiwada, Mykhaylo Trubskyy, and Martha Ross with Walter McHugh, Sheila Palma (<snide>what a complicated author attribution statement</snide>); The Plummeting Labor Market Fortunes of Teens and Young Adults; Brookings Institution; 2014-03-14; 28 pages.


Employment prospects for teens and young adults in the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas plummeted between 2000 and 2011. On a number of measures—employment rates, labor force underutilization, unemployment, and year-round joblessness—teens and young adults fared poorly, and sometimes disastrously. While labor market problems affected all young people, some groups had better outcomes than others: non-Hispanic whites, those from higher income households, those with work experience, and those with higher levels of education were more successful in the labor market. In particular, education and previous work experience were most strongly associated with employment. Policy and program efforts to reduce youth joblessness and labor force underutilization should focus on the following priorities: incorporating more work-based learning (such as apprenticeships, co-ops, and internships) into education and training; creating tighter linkages between secondary and post-secondary education; ensuring that training meets regional labor market needs; expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit; and facilitating the transition of young people into the labor market through enhanced career counseling, mentoring, occupational and work-readiness skills development, and the creation of short-term subsidized jobs.

David Autor, David Dorn; The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market; In American Economic Review; 2013; 103(5); 1553-1597 (45 pages).


We offer a unified analysis of the growth of low-skill service occupations between 1980 and 2005 and the concurrent polarization of US employment and wages. We hypothesize that polarization stems from the interaction between consumer preferences, which favor variety over specialization, and the falling cost of automating routine, codifiable job tasks. Applying a spatial equilibrium model, we corroborate four implications of this hypothesis. Local labor markets that specialized in routine tasks differentially adopted information technology, reallocated low-skill labor into service occupations (employment polarization), experienced earnings growth at the tails of the distribution (wage polarization), and received inflows of skilled labor.

Paul Beaudry, David A. Green, Ben Sand; The great reversal in the demand for skill and cognitive tasks; working paper; 2013-01; 70 pages.


What explains the current low rate of employment in the US? While there has substantial debate over this question in recent years, we believe that considerable added insight can be derived by focusing on changes in the labour market at the turn of the century. In particular, we argue that in about the year 2000, the demand for skill (or, more specifically, for cognitive tasks often associated with high educational skill) underwent a reversal. Many researchers have documented a strong, ongoing increase in the demand for skills in the decades leading up to 2000. In this paper, we document a decline in that demand in the years since 2000, even as the supply of high education workers continues to grow. We go on to show that, in response to this demand reversal, high-skilled workers have moved down the occupational ladder and have begun to perform jobs traditionally performed by lower-skilled workers. This de-skilling process, in turn, results in high-skilled workers pushing low-skilled workers even further down the occupational ladder and, to some degree, out of the labor force all together. In order to understand these patterns, we offer a simple extension to the standard skill biased technical change model that views cognitive tasks as a stock rather than a flow. We show how such a model can explain the trends in the data that we present, and offers a novel interpretation of the current employment situation in the US.

David Autor (MIT, NBER); The Polarization of Job Opportunities in the U.S. Labor Market Implications for Employment and Earnings; a commissioned work; Center for American Progress, The Hamilton Project; 2010-04; 48 pages.


Between December 2007, when the U.S. housing and financial crises became the subject of daily news headlines, and March of 2010, the latest period for which data are available, the number of employed workers in the United States fell by 8.2 million, to 129.8 million from 138.0 million. In the same interval, the civilian unemployment rate nearly doubled, to 9.7 percent from 5.0 percent, while the employment-to-population ratio dropped to 58.6 percent from 62.7 percent—the lowest level seen in more than 25 years. Job losses of this magnitude cause enormous harm to workers, families, and communities.

A classic study by economists Lou Jacobson, Robert LaLonde, and Daniel Sullivan found that workers involuntary displaced by plant downsizings in Pennsylvania during the severe recession of the early 1980s suffered annual earnings losses averaging 25 percent, even six years following displacement.2 The nonpecuniary consequences of job losses due to the Great Recession may be just as severe. Studying the same group of workers with the benefit of 15 more years of data, labor economists Daniel Sullivan and co-author Till Von Wachter3 show that involuntarily job displacement approximately doubled the short-term mortality rates of those displaced and reduced their life expectancy on average by one to one and a half years. Thus, long after the U.S. unemployment rate recedes into single digits, the costs of the Great Recession will endure.

Despite the extremely adverse U.S. employment situation in 2010, history suggests that employment will eventually return and unemployment will eventually subside. But the key challenges facing the U.S. labor market—almost all of which were evident prior to the Great Recession—will surely endure. These challenges are two-fold. The first is that for some decades now, the U.S. labor market has experienced increased demand for skilled workers. During times like the 1950s and 1960s, a rising level of educational attainment kept up with this rising demand for skill. But since the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rise in U.S. education levels has not kept up with the rising demand for skilled workers, and the slowdown in educational attainment has been particularly severe for males. The result has been a sharp rise in the inequality of wages.

A second, equally significant challenge is that the structure of job opportunities in the United States has sharply polarized over the past two decades, with expanding job opportunities in both high-skill, high-wage occupations and low-skill, low-wage occupations, coupled with contracting opportunities in middle-wage, middle-skill white-collar and blue-collar jobs. Concretely, employment and earnings are rising in both high- education professional, technical, and managerial occupations and, since the late 1980s, in low-education food service, personal care, and protective service occupations. Conversely, job opportunities are declining in both middle-skill, white-collar clerical, administrative, and sales occupations and in middle-skill, blue-collar production, craft, and operative occupations. The decline in middle-skill jobs has been detrimental to the earnings and labor force participation rates of workers without a four-year college education, and differentially so for males, who are increasingly concentrated in low-paying service occupations.

The Biology of Risk | John Coates

John Coates; The Hour Between Dog and Wolf: How Risk Taking Transforms Us, Body and Mind; Penguin; 2013-09-24; 252 pages; kindle: no, paper: $5+SHT.


John Coates; The Biology of Risk; an oped; In Sunday Review of the New York Times (NYT); 2014-06-07.

John Coates is a research fellow at Cambridge who traded derivatives for Goldman Sachs and ran a desk for Deutsche Bank. He is the author of “The Hour Between Dog and Wolf: How Risk Taking Transforms Us, Body and Mind.”

<quote>The Fed could dampen this cycle. It has, in interest rate policy, not one tool but two: the level of rates and the uncertainty of rates. Given the sensitivity of risk preferences to uncertainty, the Fed could use policy uncertainty and a higher volatility of funds to selectively target risk taking in the financial community. People running factories or coffee shops or drilling wells might not even notice. And that means the Fed could keep the level of rates lower than otherwise to stimulate the economy.</quote>


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The cortisol studies aren’t at issue so much as the choice of starting point for the financial causality claim.  Taking 1960 or 1950 as the starting point seems to give different results; i.e. less obvious causality.



Source: StockCharts

Post-Industrious Society: Why work time will not disappear for our grandchildren | Gershuny, Fisher

Jonathan Gershuny, Kimberly Fisher; Post-Industrious Society: Why work time will not disappear for our grandchildren; Working Paper 20143; Department of Sociology, University of Oxford; 2014-04-05; 43 pages; landing.


We provide a comprehensive focussed discussion of the long-term evolution of time budgets in a range of European, North-American and Pacific democracies, summarising arguments about the changing balances between work and leisure as well as paid and unpaid work. We contrast economists’ assumptions about the purely instrumental nature of work, with sociological and social-psychological arguments as to why we might want or need work in and for itself. We use evidence from 16 countries drawn from the day-diaries included in the Multinational Time Use Study to describe trends in paid and unpaid work over five decades. We demonstrate:

  1. the approximate historical constancy and cross-national similarity in the total of paid plus unpaid work time;
  2. a gender convergence in work patterns and the emergence of the phenomenon of iso-work; and
  3. a reversal in the human capital-related work-leisure gradient, which we associate with a relative decline in “industriousness” in the paid work of early 21st century societies.


  • Much turns on the definition of work.
  • <quote>The leisure of the leisure classes consisted, to some degree, of honorific idleness—but free time only really implied honour, for Veblen’s social leaders, when it indicated, not mere freedom from industry, but specifically the availability for exploit. Exploit is how Veblen’s leisure class demonstrated its superordinate status.</quote>
  • The Third Person Criterion of work => <quote>Work is any business that could be conducted on your behalf by some agent without loss of the final product. You can wash your own shirt or pay someone to wash it for you: you get the clean shirt irrespective, and either you or the launderer has done some work. Note the conditionality: work that could be undertaken by a paid agent but is in fact undertaken unpaid for one’s self or own
    household, or on a volunteer basis for others, is still work though it lies outside any specific exchange relationship.</quote>
  • embodied human capital => must devote time to paid work.
  • Factors of provision that satisfy human wants
    1. Paid labour time,
    2. unpaid labour time
    3. consumption time
  • Technical change scopes affecting time use
    1. innovation in complex technical systems
      • Broadly scoped
        • Roads, phones, power.
        • White goods, consumer goods
        • Dotcom, Internet
      • <quote>As a result much of what had once been paid work in service industries was substituted for by unpaid labour within the household (Gershuny 1977).</quote>
    2. Birth control.
      • Allows women to choose paid or unpaid work work.
      • <quote><snip/> we find a historical convergence between men’s and women’s paid/unpaid work balance, albeit driven more by a reduction of unpaid work done by women than by an increase in that done by men (Kan et al. 2011).</quote>
  • <quote>Becker (1965) provided a socially differentiated view of consumption, in
    which high-wage individuals might choose to consume expensive “time-intensive goods” (e.g. power boating, “standing under a cold shower tearing up $20 bills”) which maximise the affective return-per-minute of their consumption time, and increasing their paid work time to finance these, while low-wage individuals reduce their paid work and consume low-cost time extensive goods (“walks in the park”).</quote>
  • UN System of National Accounts (UNSD 2014)
    • System of National Accounts Production Boundary (SNAPB)
    • General Production Boundary (GPB)
  • The Great Day, a national time budget
  • <quote>the so-called “cost disease” process (Baumol 1993) in which technological innovation increases manufacturing productivity, putting pressure on service sector wages while reducing the costs of the machines used in final service production, to the point that they become feasible purchases by private households. </quote> which produces the “self-service” phenomenon (Skolka 1977, Gershuny 1977)
  • iso-work [page 18] unclearly defined.  Something about how men and women have/do the “similar” amounts of work across long periods of time.
  • Claim: <quote>Our results constitute the most comprehensive-ever description of the long-term progress of the work-leisure balance in the developed world.</quote>
  • Read the summary
  • End note: <quote>a quite new sort of theorising about the nature of work. Individuals’ time-use sequences are the DNA of economic activity.</quote>


  • commodification
  • consumption
    • time devoted to consumption
  • exchange
  • exploit
    • play-like; in the Veblen sense
    • not “exploited” in the Marxist sense
    • paid exploit
  • free time
  • industry
    • industriousness
    • dutiful
  • leisure
  • paid
    • paid labor time
  • potential earnings
  • sphere
    • sphere of exchange
    • sphere of productivity
  • unpaid
    • unpaid work time
  • volunteer
  • work


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Sheryl Connelly, Ford Motor Company

Formal: Title: Manager of Global Trends and Futuring, Ford Motor Company
Significant press cycle 2012-2013; SEO
Also noted herein.

Sheryl Connelly (Ford Motor Company); 10 Trends That Could Change World; adtechevents; On YouTube; 2013-11-13; 46:52 (Sheryl starts at 8:00).


  • Trends vs Fads
  • Parable of blue jeans as lower class clothes vs high fashion
    contra the styles of blue jeans that we see today (colors, acid washed)
  • Future Studies
    • A degree program in TX
    • A degree program in HI

In the Q&A

  • Scenarios
  • Generational Cohorts
  • Method
    • STEEP Categories
    • Generational Cohorts
    • Trends (vs Fads)
  • Method of research:
    • Read a lot
    • Start with syndicated studies if you don’t know the area
    • Pattern recognition in speculative pieces implies “a there there.”
    • Come up with a point of view, look for evidence.

Forcing & Shaping Categories


  • Economic
  • Environmental
  • Political
  • Social
  • Technological

The Trends

  1. Population Trends towards 10 Billion humans
  2. Something
  3. Aging Population
  4. Dependency Ratio (a derivative of aging)
    • BRICs
    • China old
    • India very young
  5. Something
  6. Urbanization
  7. Global Talent Shortage
    • inequality
  8. Recession for Men, Future for Female
    • Jobs lost in 2008 were “men’s jobs” (construction, finance)
    • Jobs staying or increasing were “women’s work” (health care, etc.)
  9. Information addiction
    • Low trust in government, media, etc.
    • Time poverty
    • Status
      • ostentatious displays of wealth aren’t revered any more
      • In the Know
      • Not the smartest, but In the Loop
    • Physiological
    • Information Overload, analysis paralysis, paradox of choice
  10. Something

Sheryl Connelly; Confessions of a Futurist; TEDxRVA 2013; 2013-07-19; 18:33

  • Futurism reports in to Strategy reports into Marketing.
  • The career path is through Art, Graphics Arts, Design; or maybe Business-MBA & Law.
  • Despite the degrees
    • You don’t need a degree in anything special, just the “critical thinking”
    • Marketing will hire anyone.
  • Something about a midlife crisis at 34, from the births and a child’s death.

Why Ford’s Sheryl Connelly Has Nearly Everyone’s Dream Job; Dale Buss; In Forbes; 2012-04-16.


  • Faith Popcorn, Megatrends

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Distributed Systems and the End of the API | Chas Emerick

Chas Emerick; Distributed Systems and the End of the API; In Some Blog; 2014-04-23 (or thereafter).

Other Materials

Table of Contents





Planar UltraRes UR8450-3D-ERO-B-T 84″ Touch, Multi-User Multi-Touch 4K Display

Planar UltraRes UR8450-MX-ERO-B-T 84-Inch Screen LED-Lit Monitor; 240 pounds; Amazon: $29,000+TAX+PRIME.


  • Planar® UltraRes™ Series is a family of 84″ Ultra HD (3840 x 2160)
  • Inputs
    • 1x DisplayPort 1.1a
    • 4 x HDMI with Deep Color and 4K support
  • Control
    • 1 x RS-232
    • 1 x LAN 10/100BaseT
    • 1 x USB 2.0
    • 1 x IR