For the Valta X79i Eyefinity
- F2 => Setup
- F8 => Boot Menu
For the Valta X79i Eyefinity
On the occasion of …
Generation X gets really old: How do slackers have a midlife crisis?; Sara Scribner; In Slate; 2013-08-11.
Teaser: Gutted by the economy, shipwrecked by nostalgia, Gen X stares down a midlife crisis. Winona Ryder can’t save it
The Effective Executive; HarperBusiness, revised; 1966, 2006-01-03; 208 pages; kindle: $10, paper: $3+SHT.
About managing oneself and that executives who do not manage themselves cannot possibly expect to manage other people.
Efficiency vs. Effectiveness:
Excerpts from “The Effective Executive” by Peter Drucker; unknown reviewer; undated; 6 pages.
The five habits of highly effective people (sic)
Alternative Scoring Products; Spring Privacy Series; Federal Trade Commission (FTC); 2014-03-19.
David J. Staley; A History of the Future; In History and Theory; Theme Issue 41; ISSN: 0018-2656; 2002-12; pages 72-89 (18 pages).
Does history have to be only about the past? “History” refers to both a subject matter and a thought process. That thought process involves raising questions, marshalling evidence, discerning patterns in the evidence, writing narratives, and critiquing the narratives written by others. Whatever subject matter they study, all historians employ the thought process of historical thinking.
What if historians were to extend the process of historical thinking into the subject matter domain of the future? Historians would breach one of our profession’s most rigid disciplinary barriers. Very few historians venture predictions about the future, and those who do are viewed with skepticism by the profession at large. On methodological grounds, most historians reject as either impractical, quixotic, hubristic, or dangerous, any effort to examine the past as a way to make predictions about the future.
However, where at one time thinking about the future did mean making a scientifically-based prediction, futurists today are just as likely to think in terms of scenarios.Where a prediction is a definitive statement about what will be, scenarios are heuristic narratives that explore alternative plausibilities of what might be. Scenario writers, like historians, understand that surprise, contingency, and deviations from the trend line are the rule, not the exception; among scenario writers, context matters. The thought process of the scenario method shares many features with historical thinking. With only minimal intellectual adjustment, then, most professionally trained historians possess the necessary skills to write methodologically rigorous “histories of the future.”
Catherine Tucker (MIT); The Economics of Advertising and Privacy; In Something (draft preprint submitted to Elsevier), 2011-11-19, 10 pages.
One of the new realities of advertising is that personal information can be used to ensure that advertising is only shown and designed for a select group of consumers who stand to gain most from this information. However, to gather the data used for targeting requires some degree of privacy intrusion by advertisers. This sets up a tradeoff between the informativeness of advertising and the degree of privacy intrusion. This paper summarizes recent empirical research that illuminates this tradeoff.
Matthew Melko; The Perils of Macrohistorical Studies; In World History Bulletin, Issue 17; 2001-Fall; pages 27-32 (6 pages)
[page 30] <quote>A few years ago, at a regional meeting, when I remarked to a young scholar that my study of general war was beginning to suggest that I couldn’t, with any meaningful accuracy, predict the onset of the next general war, he asked what use I thought there might be in such a study.
I asked if he were on a tenure track. He was. “I have many years’ experience on Committee A of AAUP,” I said. “I cannot predict the outcome of your application for tenure. But I do know a great deal about the processes, adn the kinds of outcomes that do occur. Might that be of any interest to you?”
He thought it might.</quote>
See Table I: General Wars in World History; Table II: Outcomes of Successive General Wars
also the endnotes of the work.
From the Executive Summary [page xiii], and also from Section 5.2 [page 49]
Obligations [of service providers, as powerful organizations]
Empowerments [of consumers, as individuals]
The definition is unclear and evolving. It is frequently defined in terms of the harms in curred when it is lost.
The Prosser Harms, <quote> page 6.
<quote>One perspective informed by new technologies and technology‐mediated communication suggests that privacy is about the “continual management of boundaries between different spheres of action and degrees of disclosure within those spheres,” with privacy and one’s public face being balanced in different ways at different times. See: Leysia Palen, Paul Dourish; Unpacking ‘Privacy’ for a Networked World; In Proceedings of CHI 2003, Association for Computing Machinery, 2003-04-05.</quote>, footnote, page 7.
An oppositional framework wherein harms are “adjacent to” benefits:
Oblique referenced via quote from Sotomayor.
<quote>“I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” United States v. Jones (10‐1259), Sotomayor concurrence.</quote>
Yet, not cited, but related (at least):
The data generators or producers in this roles framework are substantially only customers or consumers (sic).
The strong, direct, unequivocal, un-nuanced, provocative language…
<quote>For a variety of reasons, PCAST judges anonymization, data deletion, and distinguishing data from metadata (defined below) to be in this category. The framework of notice and consent is also becoming unworkable as a useful foundation for policy.</quote>
<quote>Anonymization is increasingly easily defeated by the very techniques that are being developed for many legitimate applications of big data. In general, as the size and diversity of available data grows, the likelihood of being able to re‐identify individuals (that is, re‐associate their records with their names) grows substantially. While anonymization may remain somewhat useful as an added safeguard in some situations, approaches that deem it, by itself, a sufficient safeguard need updating. </quote>
<quote>Notice and consent is the practice of requiring individuals to give positive consent to the personal data collection practices of each individual app, program, or web service. Only in some fantasy world do users actually read these notices and understand their implications before clicking to indicate their consent. <snip/>The conceptual problem with notice and consent is that it fundamentally places the burden of privacy protection on the individual. Notice and consent creates a non‐level playing field in the implicit privacy negotiation between provider and user. The provider offers a complex, take‐it‐or‐leave‐it set of terms, while the user, in practice, can allocate only a few seconds to evaluating the offer. This is a kind of market failure. </quote>
<quote>Also rapidly changing are the distinctions between government and the private sector as potential threats to individual privacy. Government is not just a “giant corporation.” It has a monopoly in the use of force; it has no direct competitors who seek market advantage over it and may thus motivate it to correct missteps. Governments have checks and balances, which can contribute to self‐imposed limits on what they may do with people’s information. Companies decide how they will use such information in the context of such factors as competitive advantages and risks, government regulation, and perceived threats and consequences of lawsuits. It is thus appropriate that there are different sets of constraints on the public and private sectors. But government has a set of authorities – particularly in the areas of law enforcement and national security – that place it in a uniquely powerful position, and therefore the restraints placed on its collection and use of data deserve special attention. Indeed, the need for such attention is heightened because of the increasingly blurry line between public and private data. While these differences are real, big data is to some extent a leveler of the differences between government and companies. Both governments and companies have potential access to the same sources of data and the same analytic tools. Current rules may allow government to purchase or otherwise obtain data from the private sector that, in some cases, it could not legally collect itself, or to outsource to the private sector analyses it could not itself legally perform. [emphasis here] The possibility of government exercising, without proper safeguards, its own monopoly powers and also having unfettered access to the private information marketplace is unsettling.</quote>
Substantially in order of appearance in the footnotes, without repeats.
And yet even with all the letters and professional editing and techwriting staff available to this national- and historical-level enterprise we still see [Footnote 101, page 31]
Qi, H. and A. Gani, “Research on mobile cloud computing: Review, trend and perspectives,” Digital Information and Communication Technology and it’s Applications (DICTAP), 2012 Second International Conference on, 2012.
The correct listing is at Springer
Digital Information and Communication Technology and Its Applications;International Conference, DICTAP 2011, Dijon, France, June 21-23, 2011. Proceedings, Part I, Series: Communications in Computer and Information Science, Vol. 166 Cherifi, Hocine, Zain, Jasni Mohamad, El-Qawasmeh, Eyas (Eds.) 2011, XIV, 806 p.
<snark>Since GNOME 3.0, the GNOME UX/UI crew have been radically altering the desktop behaviors; and not always for the better. It’s not clear what overarching theory they are following other than: remove as much functionality as possible. It’s impossible to predict where features are moving or why they are being removed or truncated. This is supremely disorienting. It’s even unclear where to read to receive warnings about these changes or participate or even listen to the debate as it occurs. One’s best bet is to “read the net” and try to find someone who has had the same Q&A, and then try to read their prose to understand how they rediscovered the setting or mitigated the problem. And hence this tutorial series, with the pictures and arrows..</snark>
What about TV ads? I don’t see Volt TV ads these days.
Norwicki: Generally speaking, the category isn’t advertised on TV. You go where the target customer for your vehicle is. And oftentimes people that are drawn to specific categories of cars, alternative-fuel vehicles in particular — those people do not view TV. They are online. They’re in social media. But they are not typical TV watchers. So just because you don’t see us on TV doesn’t mean we’re not advertising online and in social media.
If you advertise on TV, you’ll increase awareness, but that doesn’t necessarily mean you’ll increase consideration. So, by targeting we can more efficiently use our marketing funds.
GM’s statements totally align with my buying experience; I indicated such on the post-buy survey forms, and I’m sure many like me did as well. TV didn’t help, wouldn’t have helped, couldn’t have helped. The only appointment TV that I watch at this point is MLB and NFL, and typically that is 20 min or more out of phase to skip the commercials. They [GM] advertise trucks on NFL. I get that. I already own a truck. I’m not in market for a truck [yet]. My kids watch OTT-delivered video; e.g. Netflix or trawled shows in syndication on the TiVo.
What did help in the buy cycle? Q&A from friends & colleagues in my trade. These are tech-types who had already gone down the path, walked the walk & gone face-to-face with the “New GM” dealer network. I asked them about their experience: driving across the S.F. Bay, did they have to charge at work, did they charge at home, was it just “trading gas for electrons” or was there something more, etc.? How did it run when out of juice? As well, I learned that they had mitigated their ownership risk with a lease. Yet I wanted to buy for various reasons. The factory web outreach info was vastly helpful; the forums less so because of the UX, the unstructured conversations, attitude & chaos of the venues. Of course, the vehicle configurations one could construct in Build-A-Volt were not available at any dealer, but that bait-and-switch is true of any vehicle. Build-a-Volt was great though because it familiarized me with the vehicle. Seeing the vehicle is important.
My real persistent Single Nagging Question was: will the power plant “work” across time & distance at the same level of reliability that the Avalanche’s does: for 98% driving around town and freeway <= 40 miles to & from work. But-And-Also, I didn’t want to have to rent a “real” car to go to LA or on vacation, or to take my son to football league games in the north bay [Vallejo, Sacramento]; or worse have to rent a “real” car to go out to dinner with customers after work because my e-car didn’t have enough range. Reliability over time is, of course, unknowable, but reputation precedes. Yet, the Volt chief engineer Andrew Farah’s testimonial that he drove Pike’s Peak in the car went a very long way towards my imagining that the car wasn’t another toy. Oddly, so was Bob Lutz’s one-liner, something about Chicago and picking up a family member at O’Hare [cite]. But can I drive it to SF-LA — how will it handle Grapevine uphill after a 6 hr straight shot from Silicon Valley is my version of that. I haven’t attempted that yet, but it does seem within the realm of convenient feasibility. Marketing is difficult, especially of “new” or “experimental” products; even with headwinds that drive prospective customers away
One way to address the marketing issue is to approach it on a cost basis, with incentives. The state & federal subsidy money was fun, but not a top-tier motivator. Deliberate minds know that recovering abstract incentives like those post-transaction are 1+ year out with substantial execution risk to capture it at tax time or filling out after market subsidy application forms, which might or might not fail on arcane bureaucratic grounds. I bought an L2, and had it installed by a contractor. You need an L2 at home that you own and you control. It’s a cost. Also, I’ve bought enough cars to know that what what you pay to drive off the lot is 150% the sticker price on the lot. That’s how the system works. As a consumer, you modulate this dealer markup by purchasing fewer vehicles and keeping them for longer.
I have to say that the surrounding culture of electric cars is not actually an attraction or strength in selling the concept. Not for me. I wouldn’t buy a car to get into hissy fits at my work with other employees about who is parked where or whether my car needs to be moved because there are too few electrical outlets. All that does is broadcast to me that the owner has poor planning & buying skills to allow themselves to become dependent upon the kindness of strangers like that. I bought a Volt so I could have freedom; the same freedom I have had with every other car & truck I’ve owned. I can come and go when I please. I get to park in the back of the lot and nobody tells me to move my car. I would not buy a car to broadcast sanctimony or to whine at others about their lifestyles or choices. So the “ICED OUT” entitlement, on-high national policy commentariat or intellectual pseudoviolence at abusers of parking norms & signage by electric car owners speaks to me as juvenile & extreme, continuing to define the electric car genre as fully-fanatical and still pre-early adopter; filled with wild-eyed crunchy types. The red-state/blue-state color of the discourse as well. Why would I want to be a part of that? Bizzarrely, from a marketing perspective, there is a still a continued self-loathing hypothetical line of grousing about the componentry on the Volt itself (fascias, mirrors, dashboards, etc.), which is often framed “in contrast with other $50K cars.” Fair, but not fun. It’s still an experimental vehicle choice; definitely not yet mainstream. Marketing it sees it as on the cusp of cool in some areas, but definitely not yet “Crossing the Chasm” except here in the Valley of Heart’s Delight, even if Volts, Teslas and Leafs are de rigeur here.
I am mid-funnel in market in late-2014 through 2016 for:
in archaeological order, cut & paste derivatives on top, original works lower down.
The wealthy hand-to-mouth are households who hold little or no liquid wealth (cash, checking, and savings accounts), despite owning sizable amounts of illiquid assets (assets that carry a transaction cost, such as housing or retirement accounts). This portfolio configuration implies that these households have a high marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income changes–a key determinant of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy.
The wealthy hand- to-mouth, therefore, behave in many respects like households with little or no net worth, yet they escape standard definitions and empirical measurements based on the distribution of net worth. We use survey data on household portfolios for the U.S., Canada, Australia, the U.K., Germany, France, Italy, and Spain to document the share of such households across countries, their demographic characteristics, the composition of their balance sheets, and the persistence of hand-to-mouth status over the life cycle. Using PSID data, we estimate that the wealthy hand-to-mouth have a strong consumption response to transitory income shocks. Finally, we discuss the implications of this group of consumers for macroeconomic modeling and policy analysis.
Definition: households who hold little or no liquid wealth (cash, checking, and savings accounts), despite owning sizable amounts of illiquid assets (assets that carry a transaction cost, such as housing or retirement accounts). [from the abstract]
Thesis: these households have a high marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income changes–a key determinant of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy. [from the abstract]
Neil Fligstein, Doug McAdams; Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields; In Sociological Theory; Volume 29, Number 1; 2011-03; 26 pages.
In recent years there has been an outpouring of work at the intersection of social movement studies and organizational theory. While we are generally in sympathy with this work, we think it implies a far more radical rethinking of structure and agency in modern society than has been realized to date. In this article, we offer a brief sketch of a general theory of strategic action fields (SAFs). We begin with a discussion of the main elements of the theory, describe the broader environment in which any SAF is embedded, consider the dynamics of stability and change in SAFs, and end with a respectful critique of other contemporary perspectives on social structure and agency.
(quoting where possible)
Proposition 1. Unorganized social spaces become organized through a crescive social process akin to a social movement.
Proposition 2. Skilled social actors are pivotal for new fields to emerge. They must find a way to translate existing rules and resources into the production of local orders by convincing their supporters to cooperate and finding means of accommodation with other groups.
Proposition 3. Skilled social actors can help produce entirely new cultural frames for fields. They do so by building compromise identities that bring many groups along. In this process, every group’s identities and interests can be transformed.
Proposition 4. Initial resource allocations affect whether or not SAFs become organized hierarchically or cooperatively. The greater the inequality of initial resource distribution, the more likely the field will be hierarchical. Conversely, the existence of a set of groups of roughly equal size or resource endowment will encourage coalition building.
Proposition 5. SAFs are stable when they have role structures that are based on either hierarchical incumbent/challenger structures or political coalitions. Unorganized social space, on the contrary, is characterized by the frequent entry and exit of organizations, no stable social relationships, and no agreement on means and ends. This kind of drift or conflict can go on for long periods of time.
Proposition 6. New SAFs are likely to emerge nearby [to] existing SAFs. They are likely to be populated by existing groups who “migrate” or by offshoots of existing groups.
Proposition 7. States aid in the creation of new social space as intended and unintended consequences of state actions. States will also be the focus of attention from emerging SAFs.
Proposition 8. Emergent fields produce new forms of organizing. These frames can be borrowed from actors in nearby social space.
Proposition 9. Stable SAFs are characterized by a well-known role structure of incumbents and challengers or a set of political coalitions. The rules of the game will be known. Response to instability will be met by attempts to reinforce the status quo. Challengers will be particularly vulnerable to downturn. Challengers risk their survival under stable or crisis circumstances by undertaking actions vis-á-vis incumbents.
Proposition 10. Skilled actors of dominant and challenger groups will engage in moves that they hope will preserve or improve their position in the existing SAF. These constant adjustments constitute a form of organizational learning. Tactics for challengers include building niches and taking advantage of crises of other challengers. Tactics for incumbents include imitation, cooptation, or merger.
Proposition 11. SAFs are generally destabilized by external shock originating from other SAFs, invasion by other groups of organizations, actions of the state, or large-scale crises such as wars or depressions.
Proposition 12. The more connected an SAF is to other SAFs, the more stable that SAF is likely to be. Similarly, new SAFs or those with a few connections will be unstable.
Proposition 13. The more dependent an SAF is on others for resources, or the lower it is in the hierarchy of SAFs, the less stable it is.
Proposition 14. States will be the focus of action in crises. This explains why modern societies appear to be crisis ridden. General societal crises are rare, but when they occur, they have the potential to rewrite the rules across much of society.
Proposition 15. Incumbent socially skilled actors will defend the status quo. It follows that if a new frame emerges, it will come from an invader or challenger groups. They will attempt to create new rules and a new order and therefore either will build a new political coalition based on interest or create a new cultural frame that reorganizes interests and identities.
Proposition 16. An SAF crisis can result in the following: